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The military is a major employer of young men. Yet  there has been 
very little work done on the impact of military enlistment and service 
on youth labor markets. The research that has been done has usually 
been from the perspective of the military focusing on the influence that 
labor market conditions have on military enlistment, particularly  en- 
listment  by  so-called high-quality recruits.  In this  chapter and in a 
companion chapter (chap. 4) in this volume, we investigate the inverse 
question of what influence the military has on youth labor markets. 
The military is often viewed as a vague employer of last resort. For 
those meeting the military’s standards, the military offers at least one 
source of employment. The military creates a net addition to the de- 
mand for youth. What is rarely considered is the fact that the military 
cannot possibly serve as the employer of last resort for all youths. Most 
authors assume that the military chooses a fixed quota of enlistment 
needs each year and adjusts the quality of its recruits to fill the quota. 
This assumption implies that when the economy weakens, the military 
can afford to be more choosy. Thus while the military may serve as 
an employer of last resort for highly desirable recruits, for those deemed 
less desirable, the military is less likely to be an option in bad economic 
times.  Far from being an employer of last resort, for the  “weaker” 
groups, military employment opportunities will tend to dry up just when 
civilian opportunities do. 
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We  estimate a model that explores military hiring of various groups 
over the business cycle. We  find that while the military mitigates the 
impact  of  the business cycle slightly for some groups, for others it 
magnifies the cycle. 
5.1  Previous Work 
Most previous studies have at least noted the “demand constraint” 
problem. If the total demand is fixed, then enlistment behavior of some 
groups will reflect both their supply decisions and the hiring constraints 
of the military. To  isolate pure supply behavior,  nearly  all focus on 
“high-quality’’ recruits-variously  described as high school graduates, 
youths who score well on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), 
or a similar sort of classification. The assumption made, explicitly or 
implicitly, is that within the relevant range of economic conditions, all 
“high-quality’’  youth  interested  in  serving  in  the  military  will  be 
accepted. 
Most studies have used national time series models, exploring the 
influence of various economic variables-such  as military pay, civilian 
pay, and unemployment-on the military supply behavior of the high- 
ability recruits.’ The problem with purely time series models is that 
the all-volunteer force has been in existence only since 1973. Authors 
must therefore estimate models over a relatively  short time span or 
estimate the model over both draft and nondraft periods. 
A few authors have instead used  cross-section data. This method 
offers a much larger data set in the postdraft period. But it suffers from 
an inability to examine the influence of variation in variables that vary 
nationally or over time. More important, there are large and well-known 
variations in the fraction of youths who enlist from various states, and 
there is a danger that unmeasured tastes and preferences will be cor- 
related with unemployment  or civilian pay. For example, enlistment 
rates are relatively high in the South and wages tend to be low. It is 
difficult to distinguish whether the high enlistment rate is directly caused 
by low wages, or whether the same factor that allows wages to be low 
leads to a greater willingness to serve in the armed forces. 
The most appealing study to date is one by Brown (1985) where he 
uses pooled time series cross-section data. With these data he is able 
to allow for state fixed effects while maintaining a very large number 
of degrees of freedom. Brown explores the sensitivity of various clas- 
sifications of recruits to variations in military pay, area unemployment 
rates,  and civilian wages.  While  Brown’s pay  measures  performed 
somewhat unevenly, he found relatively large responses of enlistment 
among high-quality recruits to local unemployment rates. 
These methods cannot  be  used  to isolate supply behavior  for all 
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least a subset of potential enlistees must be also. In order to understand 
the influence of the military on youth labor markets, we cannot simply 
focus on the high-quality recruits  that  have drawn earlier attention. 
Instead we must try to resolve both the supply and demand side issues 
that have thus far been largely avoided. 
5.2  Models and Methods 
A fairly  clear consensus  has  emerged  in  the literature  about the 
conceptual model of  the military as a recruiter of young men. Each 
year  the  military fills  a largely predetermined  number  of  positions. 
Wages are set by  a variety of  institutional mechanisms that cannot 
adjust quickly to changes in  civilian labor market conditions.  As a 
result, the military is forced to vary the quality of recruits in order to 
meet its manpower needs. In poor economic times, the quality of new 
recruits is relatively high. By contrast, when civilian jobs are relatively 
plentiful, quality standards must decline if  all slots are to be filled. 
For youths who are prized by the military under almost any condi- 
tions, the military may serve as an employer of last resort. As such, 
the military may serve a variety of beneficial functions in the civilian 
labor market besides mitigating the negative  effects of  the business 
cycle. The military will also serve to reduce geographic variation in 
employment opportunities at a point in time.  In areas where oppor- 
tunities are more limited, more young men will enter the military, re- 
ducing the number of unemployed or underemployed persons. And if 
the military is more nearly an equal opportunity employer than private 
sector employers are, the military may help offset any vagaries of the 
private sector labor market created by inappropriate screening. Those 
hurt inappropriately by any such private sector practices have the op- 
tion of joining the military so long as they are deemed high ability by 
the military. 
By  contrast, the situation for low-quality recruits is more ominous. 
For the least qualified, the military may always look like a desirable 
option. But the least qualified are a residual group: they are taken only 
in sufficient numbers to fill the gap between total manpower needs and 
the number of positions filled by better-qualified recruits. Thus their 
numbers are determined jointly by decisions about the number of re- 
cruits needed, and by the decisions of the more highly qualified young 
men. For the residual group, the number of positions open will be lowest 
in the worst economic times because during those times, high-qualified 
recruits will be enlisting more frequently. 
Thus at the two extremes, enlistment for the recruits most desired 
by the military will be determined entirely by their supply decisions 
concerning military service. Enlistment among those deemed less de- 
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and the supply decisions made by those deemed more desirable. To 
fully understand the impact of the military on the labor market, we 
must consider not only the likelihood that different groups will desire 
military service, but also the odds that they will be accepted for it. 
We will take as our starting point the basic supply side model offered 
by Brown.  In principal,  potential recruits ought to compare the ex- 
pected future stream of benefits from civilian and military life, including 
the option of  remaining in the military  or returning to civilian life. 
Brown opts for the easiest model-essentially that future expectations 
are based entirely on current conditions. We  adopt the same assump- 
tion, though we recognize the limitations inherent in it. His econometric 
specification is essentially: 
(1)  LENLZST,  = a,U, + a2PAYNl  + a3W, + ui  + e, 
(+I  (+I  (-) 
where 
LENLZST,  = log of enlistments to population for some group in 
Ui, = unemployment rate in the civilian market in state i at time t, 
PAY,,  = log of expected miiitary pay and benefits (uniform nationally), 
Wi, = log of expected civilian pay and benefits in state i at time t, 
ui  = time invariant state fixed effect. 
state i at time t, 
So long as the group of potential enlistees chosen for study are not 
constrained-all  who want to serve can do so, this equation can be 
interpreted as the aggregation of a straightforward choice model where 
potential enlistees compare the rewards offered by military service with 
those available in  the  civilian sector.  Expected  signs are  shown in 
parentheses. 
In principal, one should use pay and unemployment rates appropriate 
for the specific group being studied. In practice, reliable values for such 
variables are not available by state. Since there is a high correlation 
between overall economic conditions and those facing any subgroup, 
this simplification should not cause important problems. It also makes 
comparisons across groups much easier. 
Problems arise, however, when the group is not entirely free to enlist. 
In the extreme, explore this model for a group of “low-quality’’ youths. 
They are a residual group that is always in excess supply. The same 
high unemployment that pushed more high-quality youths to enlist will 
reduce opportunities now. Thus if equation (1) were estimated for them, 
one might expect to find the reverse signs on each variable.  If  one 
picked a group of mixed recruits, the signs become uncertain, and one 
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Nearly all previous authors have been aware of the problems that 
demand constraints might have on their estimates, but little has been 
done to explore their significance for various groups. We  propose a 
relatively simple variation on Brown’s specification, which helps disen- 
tangle the demand constraints and supply behavior. 
The basic insight we offer is that so long as there is relatively little 
mobility across states for young men, supply behavior will be largely 
determined by local economic conditions, but demand constraints will 
reflect national conditions. When local unemployment is high or wages 
are low, the military is a more attractive alternative as supply increases. 
But demand constraints reflect the balance between the military man- 
power needs in any given year and accumulated effect of economic 
conditions on enlistment in all areas in  that  year.  When economic 
conditions are bad in many areas and manpower needs are low, then 
it ought be harder for a young man of moderate or low “quality”  to 
enter the military, regardless of the economic conditions in his local 
area. We  argue, then, that supply decisions reflect state conditions, 
whereas demand constraints reflect aggregate supply and military needs 
and thus are influenced by national conditions. 
Assuming demand constraints do in fact arise from national condi- 
tions while supply behavior is determined only by local conditions, we 
can construct a simple model that captures the effect of both supply 
and demand in a simple specification. If  we  think of  equation (1)  as 
reflecting desired, rather than actual, enlistment, then we need to mul- 
tiply the result by an acceptance rate to get actual enlistments. The 
fraction  of  any group that actually  is  accepted  will  depend  on the 
“tightness”  of the nationwide military manpower market and on the 
group’s quality. The tightness will depend on the aggregate number of 
recruits the army decides it needs and on the aggregation of  supply 
decisions of all groups in all areas. The aggregate supply effects could 
be captured by national unemployment rates and national average pay 
scales. For any group then we might write: 
(2)  FRACT, = bo + blMNr  + clUNr  + c2PAYNf  + c3WNt  + e, 
(+)  (-1  (-)  (+) 
where 
FRACT, = log of fraction of those desiring enlistment who will be 
M,,  = log of  national  enlistment levels for all groups relative to 
U,,  = national average civilian unemployment rate, 
PAY,,  = log of expected military pay and benefits (uniform nationally), 
W,,  = national average of log of expected civilian pay and benefits. 
accepted for service, 
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The coefficients will, of course, vary depending on the group, re- 
flecting their quality. For groups facing no demand constraints, all coef- 
ficients would be zero and bo, and the intercept will be 0 (since the 
fraction is in logs). For other groups, the level of military manpower 
needed and national average economic conditions will play a role. Put- 
ting together equation (l),  which is reinterpreted as a potential enlistee 
equation, and equation (2) yields: 
This equation thus contains information on both local and national 
economic conditions. This model offers several appealing features. It 
captures both supply behavior and demand constraints. For groups that 
really are not  constrained, the b and c coefficients should be zero. 
Logically, enlistment among groups that can join in unlimited numbers 
should only be influenced by the economic conditions they face. The 
level of military manpower or economic conditions in other areas should 
not make any difference. For those who are completely demand con- 
strained, local economic conditions should not influence the numbers 
accepted for service and the a coefficients will be zero. In their case, 
only those factors influencing overall “tightness” in the military man- 
power market should enter. 
Thus this  specification allows an easy test of the extent to which 
enlistment behavior reflects supply behavior or military demand con- 
straints. Note that this equation simplifies to equation (1) for groups 
that are truly  unconstrained.  It thus  offers an easy way to test the 
assumption made by  Brown  and others that  various  “high-quality ” 
groups are not effectively limited by demand. 
The model also offers a relatively easy way to explore the influence 
of the military on the labor market for various groups. Equation (3) 
implies that the military will mitigate adverse economic conditions for 
groups whose  supply effects dominate any demand constraints. For 
those where demand forces dominate, if economic conditions were to 
worsen everywhere, the military would exacerbate the economic prob- 
lems by reducing the number of people it accepts. However, so long 
as there is any supply response for the group, conditional on a particular 
level of national economic conditions, the military will tend to be an 
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This model also reveals the dangers of estimating equation (1) for a 
group that does indeea face constraints.  Certainly we would expect 
the national unemployment  rate to be correlated with the local one. 
Since equation (1) includes only the local rate, its coefficient will pick 
up both the supply effect, which is positive, and part of the demand 
constraint effect, which is negative. The coefficient will understate the 
impact of unemployment on military supply. The problem is particularly 
evident for estimating the impact of military pay. The coefficients a2 
and c2,  which capture the national  and local effects of military pay 
levels, cannot be estimated separately since there are no local variations 
in military pay.2 As a result, the coefficient on military pay does not 
capture the true supply effect of higher pay for any group facing demand 
constraints. Thus past research may have understated supply responses 
if  they were measured for groups that were demand constrained. This 
understatement may explain why Brown found smaller effects of local 
unemployment and pay for enlistments of all persons than for enlist- 
ments of high-quality enlistments only. 
This model is not without limitations. Separate identification of sup- 
ply and demand effects depends critically on the assumption that supply 
is only influenced by local conditions. For groups that  operate in a 
market larger than the state market, enlistment supply may be influ- 
enced both by local and national economic conditions. Then the coef- 
ficient on national unemployment would reflect both the negative effect 
of high average unemployment due to demand constraints and the pos- 
itive supply effect because of the effect of national conditions on en- 
listment  decisions. This problem  probably  will  be  least  serious for 
groups most likely to be demand constrained.  In general one would 
expect that less skilled and more poorly educated young men are less 
mobile and compete in a smaller labor market. 
An exactly analogous situation could arise if  there is measurement 
error in state unemployment rates. Once again national unemployment 
rates would capture some of the supply response, in this case because 
national rates are partially controlling for local economic conditions. 
The measurement error problem would probably  be exacerbated by 
allowing for state fixed effects. 
Another possible problem arises if national enlistment levels are not 
completely exogenous. If levels are at least in part influenced by the 
supply decisions, then the coefficient on the national aggregate level 
of manpower will be biased upward, giving the appearance of a demand 
constraint. 
We  estimate this enlistment model for various racial and educational 
groups over the postdraft period. For those whose enlistment behavior 
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employer of last resort. For those who are relegated to a residual group, 
the military is a desirable but cyclically sensitive employer. 
5.3  Data 
Enlistment to Population 
The Defense Manpower Data Center provided us with data on acces- 
sions by state, by individual years of age, by race, and by either ed- 
ucation level or achievement level on the AFQT qualification test be- 
tween  1973 and  1982. We  grouped  these into the age groups most 
commonly used in labor market research-16  to 19 and 20 to 24. As a 
denominator for our dependent  variable, we used  unpublished  De- 
partment of Labor (DOL) information providing population figures by 
age group and race. 
For each age and race group, we look  at four different groups of 
enlistees-all  young men, high school graduates and high school drop- 
outs, and those with high scores (mental categories I, 11,  or IIIA) on 
the AFQT. We  would like to form enlistment-to-population ratios for 
each group, but population figures are only available for these by age 
group, race, and state, on an annual basis. Thus we simply divide the 
number of  enlistees in each group by total population in the age and 
race group to form employment-to-population ratios. Since we are using 
logs and allowing for state fixed effects, so long as each group is a 
roughly constant fraction of the population group in the the state, there 
will be little impact on the results. 
Brown used  information on contracts signed by  state rather than 
accessions. Since the time between contract signing and enlistment can 
be a period of  many months, if  accessions are used, economic condi- 
tions probably ought to be lagged. In our work we found that economic 
conditions  lagged  one  year  performed  much  better  than  current 
 condition^.^ 
Unemployment 
In principal, the model calls for group-specific state unemployment 
and pay rates. State-level data on annual employment and unemploy- 
ment are available by age and race from the BLS. We  experimented 
with using group-specific rates, but there is a potentially  serious si- 
multaneity problem. If the military serves as an employer of last resort, 
it will mute the unemployment rate. If it serves as a procyclical em- 
ployer (as predicted for the lower-ability groups), variation in enlist- 
ments will tend to increase unemployment volatility. Youth rates are 105  Military Enlistments and the Youth Labor Market 
also  subject to measurement  error, particularly  rates  for nonwhite 
youths. 
The natural way to solve the problem is to instrument the appropriate 
unemployment rate with something like the prime-age adult rate. While 
we performed these regressions, we found that interpretation was sim- 
pler if we entered the adult rate (for persons aged twenty-five to sixty- 
four) directly as our measure of unemployment. These data were pro- 
vided by DOL for most states after 1976 and for about half of  them 
prior to that time. When this variable was missing, we simply excluded 
the observation. 
Military Pay 
Information is available on basic military compensation of first-year 
enlistees, including the value of allowances and tax advantages. But 
the military offers a rich array of other benefits. The best known are 
various educational benefits. These have changed over time with the 
replacement of the GI bill in  1977 for new recruits. Initially benefits 
were smaller than previously, but the package has been sweetened for 
recruits serving in various military occupations deemed relatively un- 
desirable. In addition there are very sizable pension benefits available 
to persons who stay at least twenty years (see Phillips and Wise, and 
Frant and Leonard, this volume.) Brown (n.d.) and Dale and Gilroy 
(1983) included various measures of military compensation with varying 
degrees of success. Brown found that educational benefits were roughly 
ten times more valuable than basic pay-an  extremely anomalous re- 
sult. We  experimented with Brown’s education variable and found the 
results difficult to interpret. Thus we chose to include only basic mil- 
itary  compensation  in  our  models.  This  area clearly  merits  closer 
attention. 
Civilian Pay 
State-level pay for different demographic groups by year and state 
is not readily available, But if  it were, it would likely suffer from the 
same simultaneity and measurement error problems as unemployment. 
Thus we followed Brown’s lead and used average monthly earnings of 
private workers based on unemployment insurance records. Nearly all 
workers are included in this measure, and they include both covered 
and uncovered earnings. These were deflated by an index that is again 
similar to Brown’s. It is based on the BLS Urban Family Budget series 
for various metropolitan areas and for nonmetropolitan areas by region. 
Each state’s index was derived by using a weighted average of  budget 
indexes for cities in that state (if any) and the regional nonmetropolitan 
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Total Enlistments 
For the level of total enlistments, we used the aggregate of all state- 
level enlistments for all persons between ages sixteen and twenty-four. 
The variable did not vary depending on the subgroup being studied. 
There is a chance that using this aggregated figure will introduce some 
bias, but we found  that our results were largely  unaffected  by the 
particular choice of total enlistment variable. 
5.4  Results 
Roughly 2.5 percent of all 16-to-19-year-olds enlisted per year, and 
roughly 0.8 percent of those aged 20 to 24 enlist in a given year. While 
such small figures might suggest that the likely impact of the military 
enlistments on youth  labor markets is small, several features of the 
military suggests its impact may be reasonably large. In a steady state 
these enlistment figures imply that 15 percent of youths in each cohort 
enlist at some time between their sixteenth and twenty-fifth  birthday^.^ 
Most enlistment occurs after high school when young men are eighteen 
and nineteen. Thus for those age groups, its impact is magnified. 
Moreover, for certain groups, particularly nonwhites, enlistment rates 
are much higher. Some 3.5 percent to 4 percent of all nonwhite youths 
aged 16 to 19 enlist; 1.6 percent of those aged 20 to 24 do. Since only 
about one nonwhite teenager in three has a civilian job, military en- 
listment could be seen as adding to the job total by  10 percent each 
year. The figures imply that between 20 percent and 25 percent of all 
nonwhite youth will enlist in the military at some time. Clearly a sizable 
change in  the number of  enlistments in the military  could  imply  an 
important reduction in total employment-civilian  plus military. 
Figure 5.1  shows the pattern of enlistments of young men aged  16 
to 24 as a fraction of the youth population between 1973 and 1982. The 
base year of 1982 where the enlistment-to-population ratio was .012 is 
taken to be 100. The unemployment rate, lagged one year to account 
for the lag between signing and accession, is shown also. There is a 
strongly discernible downward trend in enlistments over the period, 
with a particularly large fall between 1977 and 1978. There does not 
seem to be any discernible link between national unemployment rates 
and enlistments. Indeed unemployment  was often rising while enlist- 
ments were falling.  A  simple regression  of  enlistment-to-population 
ratios on national unemployment rates and a time trend yields a small 
and insignificant relationship.  The result is typical of those in the lit- 
erature which show little impact of national unemployment rates on 
overall enlistments. The result also suggests that it may be appropriate 
to take national enlistments as largely exogenous in our models. 107  Military Enlistments and the Youth Labor Market 
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5.4.1 
Our estimation strategy calls for regressing enlistments in a state on 
both national- and state-level unemployment and civilian pay variables, 
along with national data on military pay scales and total military en- 
listments. Table 5.1 shows our results for all youths aged 16 to 19 and 
those aged 20 to 24. All models allow for state fixed effects by using 
deviations from state means for all variables. Because deviations are 
used, the R2  accurately captures the extent to which our independent 
variables explain the variation in enlistments. 
The results for the younger age groups are extremely good. All signs 
are as expected, and most are significant. We  clearly capture some 
supply side responses even for the overall age group because both local 
unemployment  rates and local  pay  scales influence enlistment.  Ac- 
cording to these results, a one percentage point increase in the adult 
state unemployment rates will increase enlistment among the age group 
by 1 percent. This is not a particularly large response considering that 
the mean adult unemployment rate is just over 4%. Similarly the supply 
elasticity of enlistment with respect to the state pay variable is 0.4. 
When  wages  rise by  1 percent  in  the  state, enlistment falls by  0.4 
percent. 
These responses are smaller than those found by Brown in his recent 
work. Although he concentrates on supply responses of so-called high- 
quality recruits, he estimates one model for all youth. He finds that a 
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Table 5.1  Regression  Results for State Enlistment/Population Ratio by 
Age Group 
Variable 
Log of 16- 19 state enlist/pop 
Log of 20-24  state enlist/pop 
State adult unemployment 
(dep. var. for [l]) 
(dep. var. for [2]) 
Log of  state pay level 
Log of  national enlist/pop 
for all young men  16-24 
National adult unemployment 
Log of national pay level 
Log of basic military 
compensation 
Time trend (year) 
Intercept 
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Notes: All regressions allow for state fixed effects by using deviations from state means. 
All regressions were weighted by the square root of the state population aged 16 to 24. 
Means shown above are weighted means for the sample before state means are subtracted 
out. 
percentage point rise in unemployment increases youth enlistment by 
closer to 5 percent. The greater responsiveness may be explained by 
Brown’s use of  quarterly data rather than annual data and his use of 
new contracts rather than accessions. Brown’s results are rather puz- 
zling, though, since his equation clearly implies that a uniform increase 
in unemployment everywhere would lead to a sizable increase in the 
size of  the military-ven  though other evidence suggests that total 
enlistments are not very sensitive to economic conditions. 
Unlike Brown, we include national measures of  unemployment, av- 
erage civilian pay, and total military enlistments in our model to capture 
the influence of  demand constraints.  The variables show strong evi- 
dence of  such constraints for youths 16 to 19. A one point increase in 
the national adult unemployment rate reduces enlistments among this 109  Military Enlistments and the Youth Labor Market 
group by 2.6 percent. Presumably the military is able to turn to older 
recruits (or use reenlistment) to meet its manpower needs when civilian 
economic conditions are weak. Furthermore, a  1 percent increase in 
the size of enlistments nationally will lead to a 1.1 percent increase in 
the number of 16-to-19-year-olds enlisting, again suggesting that their 
numbers are constrained. High national civilian pay makes the military 
less attractive to others and ought to increase opportunities for a con- 
strained group.  Such a response  is observed, but the coefficient is 
insignificant. 
We  noted in our previous discussion that the military pay variable 
is difficult to interpret for any group facing demand constraints. On the 
one hand it encourages increased supply, but since it encourages in- 
creased supply of all groups, it also increases the demand constraints. 
Overall for this group, the supply effect appears to outweigh the de- 
mand effect, but the impact is insignificant. 
Thus both supply and demand forces seem to influence military en- 
listment among 16-to-19-year-olds. Enlistments will be drawn slightly 
disproportionately from areas suffering unusually  high levels of  un- 
employment or pay. But when times are bad and the military can get 
older recruits, it cuts back the number of younger recruits it will accept. 
The demand forces seem to predominate. If unemployment  were to 
rise everywhere (so that both state-level and national-level rates rise 
by the same amount), the total number of recruits from the younger 
age group would fall. 
For 20-to-24-year-olds, the data suggest that enlistment is influenced 
more by supply and less by demand forces. For this group a percentage 
point increase in unemployment yields a 5 percent increase in enlist- 
ment rates-a  result closer to Brown’s. By contrast a one point rise in 
the national rate pushes down enlistments by only 2 percent. Thus a 
rise in unemployment everywhere would increase the fraction of this 
group that  enlists, just as it  would diminish the the fraction of  the 
younger age group. And similarly, whereas a  1 percent rise increased 
enlistment by  younger recruits by more than  1  percent, a similar in- 
crease pushes up older recruits by less than 0.9 percent. The evidence 
suggests that the military has a slight preference for older recruits, that 
they turn to the younger groups more when manpower needs are greater 
or when civilian economic conditions inhibit the enlistment of the older 
groups. 
One anomoly appears for this age group, Higher state civilian pay 
levels reduce enlistments as expected, but the impact is insignificant. 
National pay levels, which should enter positively, instead enter with 
a large negative coefficient. It is hard to see how such a result could 
be  correct.  One might  argue that  older workers  are more likely to 
operate in a national market, and thus when national pay is high, it 110  David T. Ellwood/David A. Wise 
inhibits supply even if  local pay is low.  While possibly plausible, it 
seems strange that national unemployment rates would enter with the 
correct sign, while national pay would enter strongly and significantly 
negative. 
We  generally found that the pay variables were unstable for many 
groups in many specifications. Often the state variable would be strongly 
negative and the national variable weakly positive-as  it was for the 
younger group. For other groups or specifications, the state variable 
had little impact and the national variable was strongly negative. 
We  suspect the explanation lies in the fact that both  national and 
state pay levels are deflated to account for price changes. A large part 
of the variation in real wages over time is caused by variation in the 
deflators. (Recall that “permanent” state differences in pay levels and 
prices are captured by the state fixed effects.) Each state has a different 
deflator, but much of the variation in state indexes over time is almost 
certainly caused by variation in national policies and prices. Thus the 
two pay variables are highly collinear and may primarily reflect vari- 
ations in prices over time. We  tried entering the price indexes as sep- 
arate variables, but this tended to create instability in all the various 
pay and price variables, suggesting that the price index explanation 
may be correct. 
Generally the estimated effect of the military pay variable was also 
weak. This is less unexpected since its coefficient captures both supply 
and demand  effects. But its sign, which ought to be positive when 
supply forces dominate and negative when demand constraints are most 
powerful, was often wrong, and occasionally significantly wrong. We 
conclude that  in  this  data it  simply is  impossible  to ferret out the 
separate effects of national and state civilian pay or the role of military 
compensation. Brown’s findings on the effect of pay variables were 
similar. Occasionally the sign on civilian pay was incorrect, and two 
forms of military pay gave wildly different elasticities and occasionally 
opposite signs. 
Although the pay variables are unstable, the unemployment coeffi- 
cients seem quite insensitive to the pay specification used. Our results 
are almost identical if no pay variables are used. However, it is clearly 
inappropriate to exclude pay  variables.  Rather, it  is just difficult to 
interpret the separate coefficients. Thus all equations were estimated 
using the previous pay variables. But we choose to look only to the 
unemployment and national military enlistment variables to explore the 
relative importance of supply and demand forces in influencing enlist- 
ment. And since our interest here is primarily in the relationship be- 
tween the youth labor market and the military, we are not particularly 
troubled by our inability to generate reliable results on pay effects. 
We  have already noted  that  our inclusion of the national level of 
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Since the national enlistment level is merely the aggregation of all state- 
level enlistments, its exogeneity is questionable. It arguably should be 
excluded. Fortunately our unemployment  results are almost entirely 
unaffected by its inclusion or omission. How the level of enlistments 
of particular groups responds to variations in national manpower needs 
is extremely important, and the variable casts considerable light on the 
extent to which supply or demand forces seem to dominate. Still, its 
coefficient must be interpreted cautiously. 
5.4.2  Results for Various Subgroups 
Table 5.2 shows the coefficients on state and national adult unem- 
ployment rates and on national aggregate enlistment levels for various 
Table 5.2  Percentage Change in State Enlistments as a Result of  Changes in 
State Unemployment, National Unemployment, and the Level of 
Enlistments Nationally of  Young Men Aged 16-19 
Subgroup 
Impact of a One Point 
Rise In Adult Unemployment  Impact of a 
1% rise in 
State  NdtiOIXdl  Total Military 
Unemployment  Unemployment  Enlistments 
All men 16-19 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
High school grads 16-19 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
High school dropouts 16-19 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
High-scoring recruits 16-19 
Whites 
Nonwhites 










-  7.4 
(2.0) 
-  10.5 
(1.2) 
-  8.0 
(1  .2) 
































Nores:  Figures shown are regression coefficients. Coefficients for unemployment are 
multiplied by 100 percent. Models also include civilian pay, national civilian pay, military 
pay, time trend, and state fixed effects. All models were weighted by the square root of 
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subgroups of the 16-to-I9 population. The results show that supply and 
demand forces play very different roles in enlistment behavior of the 
several groups. 
Whites versus Nonwhites 
The racial differences are quite pronounced. A one percentage point 
increase in state unemployment rates has a small but significant effect 
on white enlistment rates, but virtually no effect on nonwhite enlist- 
ment. A similar increase in national unemployment has a very small 
negative  effect  on white  enlistment,  but  it  causes a  remarkable  11 
percent decrease in nonwhite accessions. Similarly a 1 percent increase 
in the overall size of the military leads to only a 1.04 percent increase 
in enlistments by whites, but it creates a 1.21 percent increase in en- 
listment of nonwhites. 
There is considerable evidence here that nonwhites are in excess 
supply for the military. Weak local conditions do not lead to increase 
in local enlistments. But a weak national economy sharply reduces the 
number of nonwhites enlisting. It appears that the number of nonwhites 
in the military over the business cycle is determined entirely by demand 
constraints. 
Our results should not be interpreted as indicating that the military 
has not  at least partially offset the effect of  disproportionately high 
unemployment rates for nonwhite youths. The influence of permanent 
differences in unemployment rates among groups will not be captured 
by our method since the state fixed effects eliminate all but temporal 
variation. That is, our method is only able to detect supply and demand 
responses over the cycle.5 Still, the results raise the possibility that 
increases in nonwhite enlistments do not reflect increased supply of 
nonwhites, rather the results may reflect decreased supply of whites, 
thereby freeing up positions for nonwhites. 
High School Graduates 
We  would expect that supply responses would be more important 
and demand constraints less significant for groups of  relatively high- 
quality recruits. For high school graduates overall, the results certainly 
bear out this expectation. Whereas the impact of a one point increase 
in  state unemployment is to increase enlistment for all youth just  1 
percent, for high school graduates it pushes up enlistment by over 3 
percent. And national unemployment rates have an insignificant impact 
on total enlistments. Enlistments rise slightly less than in proportion 
to total national enlistments. 
Here too there are sharp racial differences. For whites,  state un- 
employment pushes up enlistment 4 percent for each percentage point 
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national  unemployment  rates are actually positively  correlated  with 
enlistment of whites and negatively correlated for nonwhites. The result 
for whites is somewhat unexpected, but it is plausible. If the market 
for white high school graduates is at least partially national in scope, 
and  if  there  are  few  demand  constraints  for  that  group,  national 
unemployment may capture supply effects rather than demand  con- 
straints. According to this hypothesis, the enlistment behavior of  groups 
that operate in a national rather than state market ought to be positively 
correlated with both state and national unemployment. For nonwhites, 
even high school graduates seems to be largely constrained by demand. 
High School Dropouts 
Things are very different for high school dropouts. Over our sample 
period they represented about one-third of all new recruits, but their 
numbers are severely influenced by economic conditions. Here demand 
constraints are dominant. A rise in national unemployment causes an 
8 percent  fall in enlistment among whites and a 23 percent  fall for 
nonwhites. In this case even increases in state unemployment reduce 
enlistment among dropouts. The implication appears to be that even 
local areas have some demand constraints .6 When the military’s man- 
power needs increase, dropouts benefit disproportionately. Nonwhite 
dropouts, for example, increase almost twice as quickly as the military 
as a whole. Dropouts clearly are a group that is almost wholly demand 
constrained. Forces that reduce the desirability of military service or 
increase the need for military manpower help dropouts a great deal. 
For whites the figures imply that a one point increase in unemployment 
in all states would reduce dropout enlistment by  13 percent. For non- 
whites, they imply an astonishing 33 percent. 
High-Scoring Recruits 
The white versus nonwhite differentials are troubling, but difficult 
to interpret since there is little way to judge whether marginal enlistees 
among the two groups are similar in “quality.”  Thus we also explored 
enlistments of those who score highly on the AFQT qualification test. 
In this case, the patterns are similar for whites and nonwhites. 
For both groups, both state and national unemployment rates have 
a positive  effect on enlistment, and quite interestingly,  the national 
affect is larger than the local one. Apparently these “high-quality” 
youth operate more in a national than a local market. It is also possible 
that the availability of  the kinds of white-collar jobs that they presum- 
ably seek is more  sensitive to national economic conditions than to 
local ones. There is little evidence of  significant demand constraints 
for this group. The size of  the military affects the.number  of  such 
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For nonwhite youths, a 1 percent increase in the military alone leads 
to  just a 0.3 percent jump in high-quality enlistments. For both groups, 
a single point rise in unemployment rates everywhere leads to roughly 
an 8 percent increase in high-quality  enlistments. These results are 
similar to those found by Brown for high-scoring high school graduates. 
Results for similar subgroups aged 20 to 24 are shown on table 5.3. 
The results for the older age group are very similar to those for the 
younger group. In general the results seem slightly more sensitive to 
supply side and slightly less constrained by demand,  but for both groups 
they are similar. 
The findings shown in tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 are almost completely 
consistent with the basic theory set forth previously. Certain groups 
Table 5.3  Percentage Change in State Enlistments as a Result of  Changes in 
State Unemployment, National Unemployment, and the Level of 
Enlistments Nationally of  Young Men Aged 20 to 24 
Subgroup 
Impact of a One Point 
Rise In Adult Unemployment  Impact of a 
1% Rise in 
State  National  Total Military 
Unemployment  Unemployment  Enlistments 
All men 20-24 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
High school grads 20-24 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
High school dropouts 20-24 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
High-scoring recruits 20-24 
Whites 
Nonwhites 
















































Notes: Figures shown are regression coefficients. Models also include state civilian pay, 
national civilian pay, military pay, time trend, and state fixed effects. All models were 
weighted by the square root of the white or nonwhite population aged 16 to 24. Standard 
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seem to face severe demand constraints while the behavior of others 
is largely supply determined. Enlistments of groups expected to be in 
excess supply for the military seem to be determined largely by demand 
constraints; enlistments for those in excess demand seem to primarily 
reflect supply conditions. 
5.5  Implications for Youth Labor Markets 
For those groups deemed highly desirable, the military serves as the 
employer of last resort, at least to some degree. When civilian economic 
conditions worsen, these youths always have the option of enlisting. 
If flows into the military are large relative to employment or unem- 
ployment, the military can serve as a mitigating force for these groups. 
In geographic areas where jobs are limited, in  times  when  national 
economic conditions are bad, or if members of this group are suffering 
disproportionate economic hardship for some reason, military enlist- 
ment can help. 
High-scoring youths, white high school graduates, and older whites 
all fall in the largely excess demand group. For all of these, enlistment 
is sensitive to local conditions, and even if economic conditions worsen 
everywhere, their numbers will increase in the enlistment pool. 
By  contrast, for groups in excess supply, the military offers a far 
less desirable picture. When conditions worsen everywhere, the num- 
ber of  such youths enlisting clearly falls-thereby  worsening the al- 
ready bleak employment outlook. The military may serve to mitigate 
some of the geographic or demographic differences between groups, 
but since the group is in excess supply already, these effects are likely 
to be small. 
All  dropouts and nonwhite youths who do not  score well on the 
AFQT clearly  are in  excess supply. For these groups the observed 
supply responses are minimal. They fare best when national economic 
conditions are good and when the military has unusually large man- 
power needs. Over the national business cycle at least, for these groups 
the military exacerbates rather than mitigates economic conditions. 
The overall significance of these effects for youth labor markets can 
be seen on table 5.4. The table shows the impact that a one percentage 
point increase adult unemployment rates everywhere would have on 
civilian employment rates and military enlistment by  age and racial 
group. For whites, the military mitigates adverse economic conditions 
slightly. While civilian employment falls by 4.1 percent for 16-to-19- 
year-olds  and 2.7  percent for 20-to-24-year-olds, military enlistment 
rises by 1 percent in the younger group and 5 percent in the older one.’ 
If  we see each military job as equivalent to a civilian one, total em- 
ployment fell by slightly less than civilian employment. Military en- 
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Table 5.4  Impact of a One Percentage Point Change in Adult 
Unemployment for a Single Year on Civilian Employment and 
Military Enlistment, by  Race and Age Group 
Whites  Nonwhites  Whites  Nonwhites 
16-19  16-19  20-24  20-24 
Percentage change in  -4.1  -  4.5  -2.7  -  6.6 
civilian employmenta 
military enlistment 
percentage of civilian 
employment 
in civilian employment 
plus military enlistment 
Percentage change in  0.8  -  11.8  5.2  -8.3 
Enlistment as a  3.9  11.6  0.9  3.2 
Total percentage change  -3.9  -5.3  -  2.6  -6.6 
Note:  All figures are derived assuming that adult unemployment in all states rises by 
one percentage point. 
aDerived from an equation using the same dependent variables as in enlistment models, 
including state and national unemployment and state fixed effects. 
both age groups, so total employment is changed only slightly by the 
increase in  military  service. Thus while the change in  enlistment is 
sometimes dramatic in  percentage terms, as a fraction of total  em- 
ployment for whites, the changes are not particularly large. The military 
is a slight mitigating factor in the labor market. 
For nonwhites, results are more dramatic. A one point rise in adult 
unemployment rates pushes civilian employment down by 4.5 percent, 
and it reduces enlistment by 12 percent for the younger men. Since the 
ratio of enlistment to civilian employment is roughly .12, civilian em- 
ployment  plus enlistments  fall by  5.3 percent-nearly  a one-quarter 
greater fall than the civilian impact alone. The impact of a single year 
of high unemployment magnifies the job loss. And if  high unemploy- 
ment were to persist for several years, the job loss will be magnified 
because military employment lasts for several years at  least. Moreover, 
enlistment is concentrated in persons aged eighteen and nineteen, so 
the impact for that group is certainly even larger. For older nonwhites, 
the reductions in  military  enlistment  also add to civilian job losses, 
though the effects are less dramatic. 
5.6  Conclusion 
We estimated a straightforward model of military enlistment by state. 
The pay variables were unstable, but the unemployment results were 
extremely reasonable and informative.  The military  does serve as a 
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by the military. The sensitivity of enlistments to economic conditions 
is large in percentage terms for such groups, but small as a fraction of 
the total employment. Small proportions of these groups enlist even in 
poor economic times. 
By contrast, military enlistment seems to exagerate the civilian eco- 
nomic conditions for those at the bottom of the military hiring queue. 
Among nonwhites, the results are particularly dramatic because so few 
nonwhites have jobs and  enlistment  is disproportionately  high.  For 
them, fluctuations in military enlistments imply relatively large fluc- 
tuations in total employment. The fact that their enlistment behavior 
is almost unaffected by cyclic conditions shows clearly that they are 
in large excess supply to the military. While such excess supply could 
be caused by  strong tastes for military service, a far more plausible 
explanation seems to be that they are in excess supply for comparable 
jobs in the civilian sector. Thus the results can be interpreted as offering 
at least limited support to the hypothesis that demand shortages in the 
civilian market are an important cause of nonwhite unemployment. 
The results also imply that an expanding military will disproportion- 
ately benefit groups that generally fare less well in the labor market- 
nonwhites  and high school dropouts.  Clearly these groups benefited 
from the move to an all-volunteer army, at least in the sense that they 
now enlist in larger numbers. 
There is one other intriguing finding here. We  found that national 
economic conditions are actually a better predictor of enlistment supply 
behavior than are local ones for certain very-high-scoring recruits. For 
“lower-quality’’ groups the reverse seemed true. It is tempting to con- 
clude that the size of the labor market varies directly with “quality.” 
Notes 
1. See for example, Ash, Udis, and McNown  1983; Cooper 1977; Fisher 
1969; Grissmer  1979. 
2. Arguably, real military pay varies due to diEering local price levels. Brown 
convincingly argues that military pay will not necessarily be spent in the local 
area, so this variation is probably not a legitimate way to separately identify 
a2  and c2. 
3. See Brown (1985) for a discussion of various issues surrounding the lagging 
of economic conditions and for a discussion of the advantages of using contract 
signings rather than enlistments. 
4. The military actually requires that all new recruits be at least seventeen 
years old. 
5. In principal, the method could be used to detect the effect of variations 
in group-specific unemployment  rates over time, and thus to detect whether 
long-run declines in black  employment  seem to have stimulated military en- 118  David T.  Ellwood/David A. Wise 
listment by nonwhites. We tried using the state employment-to-population ratio 
for nonwhite youths as our measure of  local economic conditions, but  still 
found no effect on local conditions. 
6. The military operates on a local quota system that could have the effect 
of imposing state or local demand constraints to some degree. 
7.  It  may  appear that we are comparing stocks and  flows  on table  5.4. 
However, the change in employment is a flow as is the change in enlistment. 
We  have not explored whether flows out of the military into civilian life are 
reduced in poor economic times. 
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